Bratman's self-governance model of autonomy is part of a tradition of hierarchical accounts, according to which autonomy is a matter of the agent's psychology having a certain functioning and hierarchical structure that is constitutive of her practical standpoint. Bratman develops a sophisticated version of that account by drawing on a temporally extended sense of agency, which is realized and sustained by the role higher-order (self-governing) policies play—by being subject to rational demands of consistency, coherence and stability—in coordinating one's life over (...) time. We shall argue that: (i) there may be autonomous agency without self-governing policies; (ii) there is a tension between understanding autonomy as involving temporally extended agency and as realized essentially by those rational demands. (shrink)

It is widely believed by philosophers that we human beings are capable of stepping back from inclinations to act in a certain way and consider whether we should do so. If we judge that there are enough reasons in favour of following our initial inclination, we are definitely motivated, and, if all goes well, we act. This view of human agency naturally leads to the idea that our actions are self-determined, or controlled by ourselves. Some go one step further to (...) the point of saying that we should extend the fundamental aspects of this view of human agency to the epistemic realm. This we call ‘the control-view”. Here we will make a strong case against the control-view. While we have a substantial control over our practical lives, it is very unlikely that this extends to our epistemic lives. Our discussion will proceed in three stages. We will present two asymmetries between our practical and epistemic lives which are followed by a general argument against the control-view. (shrink)

Na literatura recente sobre os desafios gerados pelas novas tecnologias, certos autores defendem o Princípio da Precaução como um princípio de racionalidade central em deliberações sobre práticas associadas àquelas tecnologias. Há dois sentidos possíveis para ‘precaução’: um formal, outro substantivo. Tais autores parecem interpretar o PP no último sentido, a fim de eliminar absolutamente os riscos possíveis das novas tecnologias à humanidade. Contra esta interpretação, argumentaremos que precaução não é o tipo de consideração que figure adequadamente em uma teoria da (...) deliberação para ações humanas e sugeriremos que o PP parece, na verdade, para tais autores, envolver um compromisso moral. Mas, neste caso, ele não é menos controverso do que outros princípios morais. (shrink)

O princípio da precaução vem sendo frequentemente invocado em discussões sobre os usos a serem feitos dos resultados de vários dos avanços tecnológicos recentes. Como tal, o PP se oferece como um princípio absoluto para decisões reguladoras de práticas que se apropriam de tais avanços tecnológicos. Porém, um dos problemas centrais do PP está em sua falta de clareza conceitual. O propósito central deste artigo é contribuir para tal esclarecimento. Diante disto, discutiremos o PP a partir de dois pontos de (...) vista: um referente à racionalidade epistêmica; o outro referente à moralidade. Argumentaremos que compromissos relacionados a estes pontos de vista compõem o PP e, contrariamente à expressiva tendência na literatura contemporânea de interpretar o PP como obedecendo a uma lógica consequencialista de ações, tentaremos mostrar que o PP é um princípio que expressa um ideal deontológico. Por fim, consideraremos alguns problemas relacionados ao PP. Mais especificamente, argumentaremos que o PP incorpora ideais substantivos epistêmicos e morais, contrariamente à tendência disseminada entre defensores do mesmo, que sugerem que o PP é um princípio formal e trivial para invidíduos racionais e morais.: In recent discussions about the uses to be made of the latest scientific and technological results there have often been appeals to the Precautionary Principle. As such, the PP has been taken up as an absolute principle for regulatory decisions regarding practices that make use of the scientific and technological developments. However, one serious problem with the PP is its lack of conceptual clarity. The main aim of this paper is to contribute to such a clarification. Thus, we shall approach the PP from two standpoints: one related to epistemic rationality; the other related to morality. We shall argue that commitments stemming from these two standpoints are constitutive of the PP and, contrary to the current trend in the contemporary literature on the topic—of interpreting the PP as a principle which carries a consequentialist logic of assessment of actions—, we will try to show that the PP is a principle which expresses a deontological ideal. In the last part of the paper, we will address some problems that might affect the PP. More specifically, we shall argue that the PP embodies substantive epistemic and moral ideals, and that this lies in direct opposition to a widespread tendency among defenders of the PP of seeing it as a formal and trivial principle for rational and moral individuals. Keywords: Risk, rationality, precaution. (shrink)